

**TAB 10**

*Case Name:*  
**Nelson Education Ltd. (Re)**

**IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Lenders  
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.  
C-36, as amended  
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise  
or Arrangement of Nelson Education  
Ltd. and Nelson Education Holdings Ltd., Applicants**

[2015] O.J. No. 4628

2015 ONSC 5557

29 C.B.R. (6th) 140

258 A.C.W.S. (3d) 465

2015 CarswellOnt 13576

Court File No.: CV15-10961-00CL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice  
Commercial List

**F.J.C. Newbould J.**

Heard: August 13 and 27, 2015.

Judgment: September 8, 2015.

(75 paras.)

*Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters --  
Compromises and arrangements -- With secured creditors -- Claims -- Priority -- Financial  
collateral -- Sanction by court -- Application by Nelson Education, previously granted protection  
under CCAA, for approval of sale of substantially all of their assets and business to newly  
incorporated entity to be owned indirectly by Nelson's first ranked secured lenders pursuant to  
credit bid allowed in part -- Motion by RBC for payment of second lien interest outstanding  
dismissed -- Bid followed comprehensive and open sale or investment sales process (SISP) -- SISP*

*and credit bid sale transaction met requirements of section 36(3) of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Order made in favour of RBC as second lien agent would reduce Nelson's collateral -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, s. 36(3).*

Application by Nelson Education, previously granted protection under the CCAA, for the approval of the sale of substantially all of their assets and business to a newly incorporated entity to be owned indirectly by Nelson's first ranked secured lenders pursuant to a credit bid. Motion by RBC for payment of second lien interest outstanding. The bid followed a comprehensive and open sale or investment sales process (SISP). If approved, the second lien lenders would receive nothing for their outstanding loans. Nelson was indebted in the amount of US\$269 million under the first lien credit agreement and US\$153 million under the second lien credit agreement. The purchase would allow the business to continue as a going concern. An intercreditor agreement provided that second lien lenders were not to object to any sale consented to by first lien claimholders. Eighty-eight per cent of the first lien lenders consented to the sale. RBC, a first lien lender, second lien lender, and second lien agent, was the only first lien lender who did not consent.

HELD: Motion by Nelson allowed in part; motion by RBC dismissed. The SISP and the credit bid sale transaction met the requirements of section 36(3) of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. Nelson was granted a vesting order vesting all right, title and interest in the purchased assets in the purchaser. Nelson was granted an order allowing it to pay all accrued and unpaid interest owing to first lien lenders and all unpaid professional fees. A release by the first lien lenders requested by Nelson was not approved. A stockholders and registration rights agreement was not declared effective and binding on all first lien lenders as assisting the purchaser's parent company with its corporate governance was not appropriate. Nelson's cash on hand was collateral and was subject to the rights of the first lien lenders. An order made in favour of RBC as second lien agent would reduce the collateral.

**Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:**

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, s. 11, s. 36(3)

Companies' Lenders Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36,

**Counsel:**

*Benjamin Zarnett, Jessica Kimmel and Caroline Descours, for the Applicants.*

*Robert W. Staley, Kevin J. Zych and Sean Zweig, for the First Lien Agent and the First Lien Steering Committee.*

*John L. Finnigan, D.J. Miller and Kyla E.M. Mahar, for Royal Bank of Canada.*

*Orestes Pasparaskis, for the Monitor.*

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## **ENDORSEMENT**

**1** F.J.C. NEWBOULD J.:-- The applicants Nelson Education Ltd. ("Nelson") and Nelson Education Holdings Ltd. sought and obtained protection under the CCAA on May 12, 2015. They now apply for approval of the sale of substantially all of the assets and business of Nelson to a newly incorporated entity to be owned indirectly by Nelson's first ranked secured lenders (the "first lien lenders") pursuant to a credit bid made by the first lien agent. Nelson also seeks ancillary orders relating to the sale. The effect of the credit bid, if approved, is that the second lien lenders will receive nothing for their outstanding loans.

**2** RBC is one of 22 first lien lenders, a second lien lender and agent for the second lien lenders. At the time of its motion to replace the Monitor, RBC did not accept that the proposed sale should be approved. RBC now takes no position on the sale approval motion other than to oppose certain ancillary relief sought by the applicants. RBC also has moved for an order that certain amounts said to be owing to it and their portion of a consent fee should be paid by Nelson prior to the completion of the sale. The applicants and the first lien lenders oppose the relief sought by RBC.

### **Nelson business**

**3** Nelson is a Canadian education publishing company, providing learning solutions to universities, colleges, students, teachers, professors, libraries, government agencies, schools, professionals and corporations across the country.

**4** The business and assets of Nelson were acquired by an OMERS entity and certain other funds from the Thomson Corporation in 2007 together with U.S. assets of Thomson for U.S. \$7.75 billion, of which US\$550 million was attributed to the Canadian business. The purchase was financed with first lien debt of approximately US\$311.5 million and second lien debt of approximately US\$171.3 million.

**5** The maturity date under the first lien credit agreement was July 3, 2014 and the maturity date under the second lien credit agreement was July 3, 2015. Nelson has not paid the principal balances owing under either loan. It paid interest on the first lien credit up to the filing of this CCAA application. It has paid no interest on the second lien credit since April 2014. As of the filing date, Nelson was indebted in the aggregate principal amounts of approximately US\$269 million, plus accrued interest, costs and fees, under the first lien credit agreement and approximately US\$153 million, plus accrued interest, costs and fees, under the second lien credit agreement.

**6** Because these loans are denominated in U.S. dollars, the recent decline in the Canadian dollar against the United States dollar has significantly increased the Canadian dollar balance of the loans.

Nelson generates substantially all of its revenue in Canadian dollars and is not hedged against currency fluctuations. Based on an exchange rate of CAD/USD of 1.313, as of August 10, 2015, the Canadian dollar principal balances of the first and second lien loans are \$352,873,910 and \$201,176,237.

7 According to Mr. Greg Nordal, the CEO of Nelson, the business of Nelson has been affected by a general decline in the education markets over the past few years. Notwithstanding the industry decline over the past few years, Nelson has maintained strong EBITDA over each of the last several years.

#### **Discussions leading to the sale to the first lien lenders**

8 In March 2013, Nelson engaged Alvarez & Marsal Canada Securities ULC ("A&M"), the Canadian corporate finance arm of Alvarez & Marsal to assist it in reviewing and considering potential strategic alternatives. RBC, the second lien agent also engaged a financial advisor in March 2013 and the first lien steering committee engaged a financial advisor in June 2013. RBC held approximately 85% of the second lien debt.

9 Commencing in April 2013, Nelson and its advisors entered into discussions with stakeholders including the RBC as second lien agent, the first lien steering committee and their advisors. Nelson sought to achieve as its primary objective a consensual transaction that would be supported by all of the first lien lenders and second lien lenders. These discussions took place until September 2014. No agreement with the first lien lenders and second lien lenders was reached.

10 In April 2014, Nelson and the second lien lenders agreed to two extensions of the cure period under the second lien credit agreement in respect of the second lien interest payment due on March 31, 2014, to May 30, 2014. In connection with these extensions, Nelson made a partial payment of US\$350,000 in respect of the March interest payment and paid certain professional fees of the second lien lenders. Nelson requested a further extension of the second lien cure period beyond May 30, 2014, but the second lien lenders did not agree. Thereafter, Nelson defaulted under the second lien credit agreement and failed to make further interest payments to the second lien lenders.

11 The first lien credit agreement matured on July 3, 2014. On July 7, 2014, Nelson proposed an amendment and extension of that agreement and solicited consent from its first lien lenders. RBC, as one of the first lien lenders was prepared to consent to the Nelson proposal, being a consent and support agreement, but no agreement was reached with the other first lien lenders and it did not proceed.

12 In September, 2014, Nelson proposed in a term sheet to the first lien lenders a transaction framework for a sale or restructuring of the business on the terms set out in a term sheet dated September 10, 2014 and sought their support. In connection with the first lien term sheet, Nelson entered into a first lien support agreement with first lien lenders representing approximately 88% of the principal amounts outstanding under the first lien credit agreement. The consenting first lien

lenders comprised 21 of the 22 first lien lenders, the only first lien lender not consenting being RBC. Consent fees of approximately US\$12 million have been paid to the consenting first lien lenders.

13 The first lien term sheet provided that Nelson would conduct a comprehensive and open sale or investment sales process (SISP) to attempt to identify one or more potential purchasers of, or investors in, the Nelson business on terms that would provide for net sale or investment proceeds sufficient to pay in full all obligations under the first lien credit agreement or that was otherwise acceptable to first lien lenders holding at least 66 2/3% of the outstanding obligations under the first lien credit agreement. If such a superior offer was not identified pursuant to the SISP, the first lien lenders would become the purchaser and purchase substantially all of the assets of Nelson in exchange for the conversion by all of the first lien lenders of all of the debt owing to them under the first lien credit agreement into a new first lien term facility and for common shares of the purchaser.

14 In September 2014, the company engaged A&M to assist with the SISP. By that time, A&M had been advising the Company for over 17 months and had gained an understanding of the Nelson Business and the educational publishing industry. The SISP was structured as a two-phase process.

15 Phase 1 involved (i) contacting 168 potential purchasers, including both financial and strategic parties located in Canada, the United States and Europe, and 11 potential lenders to ascertain their potential interest in a transaction, (ii) initial due diligence and (iii) receipt by Nelson of non-binding letters of interest ("LOIs"). The SISP provided that interested parties could propose a purchase of the whole or parts of the business or an investment in Nelson.

16 Seven potential purchasers submitted LOIs under phase 1, six of which were offers to purchase substantially all of the Nelson business and one of which was an offer to acquire only the K-12 business. Nelson reviewed the LOIs with the assistance of its advisors, and following consultation with the first lien steering committee and its advisors, invited five of the parties that submitted LOIs to phase 2 of the SISP. Phase 2 of the SISP involved additional due diligence, data room access and management presentations aimed at completion of binding documentation for a superior offer.

17 Three participants submitted non-binding offers by the deadline of December 19, 2014, two of which were for the purchase of substantially all of the Nelson business and one of which was for the acquisition of the K-12 business. All three offers remained subject to further due diligence and reflected values that were significantly below the value of the obligations under the first lien credit agreement.

18 On December 19, 2014, one of the participants advised A&M that it required additional time to complete and submit its offer, which additional time was granted. An offer was subsequently submitted but not ultimately advanced by the bidder.

19 Nelson, with the assistance of its advisors, maintained communications throughout its

restructuring efforts with Cengage Learnings, the company that has the U.S. business that was sold by Thomson and which is a key business partner of Nelson. Cengage submitted an expression of interest for the higher education business that, even in combination with the offer received for the K-12 business, was substantially lower than the amount of the first lien debt. In February 2015, Cengage and Nelson terminated discussions about a potential sale transaction.

20 Ultimately, phase 2 of the SISP did not result in a transaction that would generate proceeds sufficient to repay the obligations under the first lien credit agreement in full or would otherwise be supported by the first lien lenders. Accordingly, with the assistance of A&M and its legal advisors, and in consultation with the first lien steering committee, Nelson determined that it should proceed with the sale transaction pursuant to the first lien support agreement.

#### **Sale transaction**

21 The sale transaction is an asset purchase. It will enable the Nelson business to continue as a going concern. It includes:

- (a) the transfer of substantially all of Nelson's assets to a newly incorporated entity to be owned indirectly by the first lien lenders;
- (b) the assumption by the purchaser of substantially all of Nelson's trade payables, contractual obligations and employment obligations incurred in the ordinary course and as reflected in its balance sheet, excluding some obligations including the obligations under the second lien credit agreement and an intercompany promissory note of approximately \$102.3 million owing by Nelson to Nelson Education Holdings Ltd.;
- (c) an offer of employment by the purchaser to all of Nelson's employees; and
- (d) a release by the first lien lenders of all of the indebtedness owing under the first lien credit agreement in exchange for: (i) 100% of the common shares of a newly incorporated entity that will own 100% of the common shares of the purchaser, and (ii) the obligations under a new US\$200 million first lien term facility to be entered into by the Purchaser.

22 The relief sought by the applicants apart from the approval of the sale transaction involves ancillary relief, including authorizing the distribution from Nelson's cash on hand to the first lien lenders of outstanding fees and interest, effecting mutual releases of parties associated with the sale transaction, and deeming a shareholders' rights agreement to bind all shareholders of the purchaser. This ancillary relief is opposed by RBC.

## Analysis

### (i) Sale approval

23 RBC says it takes no position on the sale, although it opposes some of the terms and seeks an order paying the second lien lenders their pre-filing interest and expense claims. Whether RBC is entitled to raise the issues that it has requires a consideration of the intercreditor agreement of July 5, 2007 made between the agents for the first lien lenders and the second lien lenders.

24 Section 6.1(a) of the intercreditor agreement provides that the second lien lenders shall not object to or oppose a sale and of the collateral and shall be deemed to have consented to it if the first lien claimholders have consented to it. It provides:

The Second Lien Collateral Agent on behalf of the Second Lien Claimholders agrees that it will raise no objection or oppose a sale or other disposition of any Collateral free and clear of its Liens and other claims under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (or any similar provision of any other Bankruptcy Law or any order of a court of competent jurisdiction) if the First Lien Claimholders have consented to such sale or disposition of such assets and the Second Lien Collateral Agent and each other Second Lien Claimholder will be deemed to have consented under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (or any similar provision of any other Bankruptcy Law or any order of a court of competent jurisdiction) to any sale supported by the First Lien Claimholders and to have released their Liens in such assets. (underlining added)

25 Section 6.11 of the intercreditor agreement contained a similar provision. RBC raises the point that for these two sections to be applicable, the first lien claimholders must have consented to the sale, and that the definition of first lien claimholders means that all of the first lien lenders must have consented to the sale. In this case, only 88% of the first lien lenders consented to the sale, the lone holdout being RBC. The definition in the intercreditor agreement of first lien claimholder is as follows:

**"First Lien Claimholders"** means, at any relevant time, the holders of First Lien Obligations at that time, including the First Lien Collateral Agent, the First Lien Lenders, any other "Secured Party" (as defined in the First Lien Credit Agreement) and the agents under the First Lien Loan Documents.

26 The intercreditor agreement is governed by the New York law and is to be construed and enforced in accordance with that law. The first lien agent filed an opinion of Allan L. Gropper, a former bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York and undoubtedly highly qualified to express proper expert opinions regarding the matters in issue. Mr. Gropper did not, however, discuss the principles of interpretation of a commercial contract under New York law, and in the absence of such evidence, I am to take the law of New York so far as contract interpretation is

concerned as the same as our law. In any event, New York law regarding the interpretation of a contract would appear to be the same as our law. See *Cruden v. Bank of N.Y.*, 957 F.2d 961, 976 (2d Cir. 1992) and *Rainbow v. Swisher*, 72 N.Y. 2d 106, 531 N.Y.S. 775, 527 N.E.2d 258 (1988). Mr. Gropper did opine that the sections in question are valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms.<sup>1</sup>

**27** The intercreditor agreement, like a lot of complex commercial contracts, appears to have a hodgepodge of terms piled on, or added to, one another, with many definitions and exceptions to exceptions. That is what too often appears to happen when too many lawyers are involved in stirring the broth. It is clear that there are many definitions, including a reference to First Lien Lenders, which is defined to be the Lenders as defined in the First Lien Loan Documents, which is itself a defined term, meaning the First Lien Credit Agreement and the Loan Documents. The provisions of the first lien credit agreement make clear that the Lenders include all those who have lent under that agreement, including obviously RBC.

**28** Under section 8.02(d) of the first lien credit agreement, more than 50% of the first lien lenders (the "Required Lenders") may direct the first lien agent to exercise on behalf of the first lien lenders all rights and remedies available to. In this case 88% of the first lien lenders, being all except RBC, directed the first lien agent to credit bid all of the first lien debt. This credit bid was thus made on behalf of all of the first lien lenders, including RBC.

**29** While the definition of First Lien Claimholders is expansive and refers to both the First Lien Collateral Agent (the first lien agent) and the First Lien Lenders, suggesting a distinction between the two, once the Required Lenders have caused a credit bid to be made by the First Lien Collateral Agent, RBC in my view is taken to have supported the sale that is contemplated by the credit bid.

**30** It follows that RBC is deemed under section 6.11 of the intercreditor agreement to have consented to the sale supported by the first lien claimholders. It is nevertheless required that I determine whether the sale and its terms should be approved. It is also important to note that no sale agreement has been signed and it awaits an order approving the form of Asset Purchase Agreement submitted by Nelson in its motion materials.

**31** This is an unusual CCAA case. It involves the acquisition of the Nelson business by its senior secured creditors under a credit bid made after a SISP conducted before any CCAA process and without any prior court approval of the SISP terms. The result of the credit bid in this case will be the continuation of the Nelson business in the hands of the first lien lenders, a business that is generating a substantial EBITDA each year and which has been paying its unsecured creditors in the normal course, but with the extinguishment of the US \$153 million plus interest owed to the second lien lenders.

**32** Liquidating CCAA proceedings without a plan of arrangement are now a part of the insolvency landscape in Canada, but it is usual that the sale process be undertaken after a court has blessed the proposed sale methodology with a monitor fully participating in the sale process and

reporting to the court with its views on the process that was carried out<sup>2</sup>. None of this has occurred in this case. One issue therefore is whether the SISP carried out before credit bid sale that has occurred involving an out of court process can be said to meet the *Soundair*<sup>3</sup> principles and that the credit bid sale meets the requirements of section 36(3) of the CCAA.

**33** I have concluded that the SISP and the credit bid sale transaction in this case does meet those requirements, for the reasons that follow.

**34** Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. was named the Monitor in the Initial Order over the objections of RBC, but shortly afterwards on the come-back motion by RBC, was replaced as Monitor by FTI Consulting Inc. The reasons for this change are contained in my endorsement of June 2, 2015. There was no suggestion of a lack of integrity or competence on the part of A&M or Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. In brief, the reason was that A&M had been retained by Nelson in 2013 as a financial advisor in connection with its debt situation, and in September 2014 had been retained to undertake the SISP process that has led to the sale transaction to the first lien lenders. I did not consider it right to put Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. in the position of providing independent advice to the Court on the SISP process that its affiliate had conducted, and that it would be fairer to all concerned that a different Monitor be appointed in light of the fact that the validity of the SISP process was going to be front and centre in the application of Nelson to have the sale agreement to the first lien lenders approved. Accordingly FTI was appointed to be the Monitor.

**35** FTI did a thorough review of all relevant facts, including interviewing a large number of people involved. In its report to the Court the Monitor expressed the following views:

- (a) The design of the SISP was typical of such marketing processes and was consistent with processes that have been approved by the courts in many CCAA proceedings;
- (b) The SISP allowed interested parties adequate opportunity to conduct due diligence, both A&M and management appear to have been responsive to all requests from potentially interested parties and the timelines provided for in the SISP were reasonable in the circumstances;
- (c) The activities undertaken by A&M were consistent with the activities that any investment banker or sale advisor engaged to assist in the sale of a business would be expected to undertake;
- (d) The selection of A&M as investment banker would not have had a detrimental effect on the SISP or the value of offers;

- (e) Both key senior management and A&M were incentivised to achieve the best value available and there was no impediment to doing so;
- (f) The SISP was undertaken in a thorough and professional manner;
- (g) The results of the SISP clearly demonstrate that none of the interested parties would, or would be likely to, offer a price for the Nelson business that would be sufficient to repay the amounts owing to the first lien lenders under the first lien credit agreement
- (h) The SISP was a thorough market test and can be relied on to establish that there is no value beyond the first lien debt.

**36** The Monitor expressed the further view that:

- (a) There is no realistic prospect that Nelson could obtain a new source of financing sufficient to repay the first lien debt;
- (b) An alternative debt restructuring that might create value for the second lien lenders is not a viable alternative at this time;
- (c) There is no reasonable prospect of a new sale process generating a transaction at a value in excess of the first lien debt;
- (d) It does not appear that there are significant operational improvements reasonably available that would materially improve profitability in the short-term such that the value of the Nelson business would increase to the extent necessary to repay the first lien debt and, accordingly, there is no apparent benefit from delaying the sale of the business.

**37** *Soundair* established factors to be considered in an application to approve a sale in a receivership. These factors have widely been considered in such applications in a CCAA proceeding. They are:

- (a) whether sufficient effort has been made to obtain the best price and that the receiver or debtor (as applicable) has not acted improvidently;

- (b) whether the interests of all parties have been considered;
- (c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers have been obtained; and
- (d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

38 These factors are now largely mirrored in section 36(3) of the CCAA that requires a court to consider a number of factors, among other things, in deciding to authorize a sale of a debtor's assets. It is necessary to deal briefly with them.

- (a) Whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances. In this case, despite the fact that there was no prior court approval to the SISF, I accept the Monitor's view that the process was reasonable.
- (b) Whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition. In this case there was no monitor at the time of the SISF. This factor is thus not strictly applicable as it assumes a sale process undertaken in a CCAA proceeding. However, the report of FTI blessing the SISF that took place is an important factor to consider.
- (c) Whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in its opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy. The Monitor did not make such a statement in its report. However, there is no reason to think that a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy would be more beneficial to the creditors. The creditors negatively affected could not expect to fare better in a bankruptcy.
- (d) The extent to which the creditors were consulted. The first lien steering committee was obviously consulted. Before the SISF, RBC, the second lien lenders' agent, was consulted and actively participated in the reconstruction discussions. I take it from the evidence that RBC did not actively participate in the SISF, a decision of its choosing, but was provided some updates.
- (e) The effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other

interested parties. The positive effect is that all ordinary course creditors, employees, suppliers and customers will be protected. The effect on the second lien lenders is to wipe out their security and any chance of their loans being repaid. However, apart from their being deemed to have consented to the sale, it is clear that the second lien lenders have no economic interest in the Nelson assets except as might be the case some years away if Nelson were able to improve its profitability to the point that the second lien lenders could be paid something towards the debt owed to them. RBC puts this time line as perhaps five years and it is clearly conjecture. The first lien lenders however are not obliged to wait in the hopes of some future result. As the senior secured creditor, they have priority over the interests of the second lien lenders.

There are some excluded liabilities and a small amount owing to former terminated employees that will not be paid. As to these the Monitor points out that there is no reasonable prospect of any alternative solution that would provide a recovery for those creditors, all of whom rank subordinate to the first lien lenders.

(f) Whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value. The Monitor is of the view that the results of the SISP indicate that the consideration is fair and reasonable in the circumstances and that the SISP can, and should, be relied on for the purposes of such a determination. There is no evidence to the contrary and I accept the view of the Monitor.

39 In the circumstances, taking into account the *Soundair* factors and the matters to be considered in section 36(3) of the CCAA, I am satisfied that the sale transaction should be approved. Whether the ancillary relief should be granted is a separate issue, to which I now turn.

(ii) Ancillary claimed relief

(a) Vesting order

40 The applicants seek a vesting order vesting all of Nelson's right, title and interest in and to the purchased assets in the purchaser, free and clear of all interests, liens, charges and encumbrances, other than the permitted encumbrances and assumed liabilities contemplated in the Asset Purchase Agreement. It is normal relief given in an asset sale under the CCAA and it is appropriate in this case.

**(b) Payment of amounts to first lien lenders**

41 As a condition to the completion of the transaction, Nelson is to pay all accrued and unpaid interest owing to the first lien lenders and all unpaid professional fees of the first lien agent and the first lien lenders outstanding under the first lien credit agreement. RBC does not oppose this relief.

42 If the cash is not paid out before the closing, it will be an asset of the purchaser as all cash on hand is being acquired by the purchaser. Thus the first lien lenders will have the cash. However, because the applicant is requesting a court ordered release by the first lien lenders of all obligations under the first lien credit agreement, the unpaid professional fees of the first lien agent and the first lien lenders that are outstanding under the first lien credit agreement would no longer be payable after the closing of the transaction. Presumably this is the reason for the payment of these prior to the closing.

43 These amounts are owed under the provisions of the first lien credit agreement and have priority over the interests of the second lien lenders under the intercreditor agreement. However, on June 2, 2015 it was ordered that pending further order, Nelson was prevented from paying any interest or other expenses to the first lien lenders unless the same payments owing to the second lien lenders. Nelson then chose not to make any payments to the first lien lenders. It is in effect now asking for an order nunc pro tunc permitting the payments to be made. I have some reluctance to make such an order, but in light of no opposition to it and that fact that it is clear from the report of the Monitor that there is no value in the collateral for the second lien lenders, the payment is approved.

**(c) Releases**

44 The applicants request an order that would include a broad release of the parties to the Asset Purchase Agreement as well as other persons including the first lien lenders.

45 The Asset Purchase Agreement has not been executed. In accordance with the draft approval and vesting order sought by the applicants, it is to be entered into upon the entry of the approval and vesting order. The release contained in the draft Asset Purchase Agreement in section 5.12 provides that the parties release each other from claims in connection with Nelson, the Nelson business, the Asset Purchase Agreement, the transaction, these proceedings, the first lien support agreement, the supplemental support agreement, the payment and settlement agreement, the first lien credit agreement and the other loan documents or the transactions contemplated by them. Released parties are not released from their other obligations or from claims of fraud. The release also does not deal with the second lien credit agreement or the second lien lenders.

46 The first lien term sheet made a part of the support agreement contained terms and conditions, but it stated that they would not be effective until definitive agreements were made by the applicable parties and until they became effective. One of the terms was that there would be a release "usual and customary for transactions of this nature", including a release by the first lien

lenders in connection with "all matters related to the Existing First Lien Credit Agreement, the other Loan Documents and the transactions contemplated herein". RBC was not a party to the support agreement or the first lien term sheet.

47 The release in the Asset Purchase Agreement at section 5.12 provides that "each of the Parties on behalf of itself and its Affiliates does hereby forever release...". "Affiliates" is defined to include "any other Person that directly or indirectly...controls...such Person". The party that is the purchaser is a New Brunswick numbered company that will be owned indirectly by the first lien lenders. What instructions will or have been given by the first lien lenders to the numbered company to sign the Asset Purchase Agreement are not in the record, but I will assume that the First Lien Agent has or will authorize it and that RBC as a first lien lenders has not and will not authorize it.

48 Releases are a feature of approved plans of compromise and arrangement under the CCAA. The conditions for such a release have been laid down in *ATB Financial v. Metcalf and Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587 at paras. 43 and 70. Third party releases are authorized under the CCAA if there is a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan. In *Metcalf*, Blair J.A. found compelling that the claims to be released were rationally related to the purpose of the plan and necessary for it and that the parties who were to have claims against them released were contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the plan<sup>4</sup>.

49 While there is no CCAA plan in this case, I see no reason not to consider the principles established in *Metcalf* when considering a sale such as this under the CCAA, with any necessary modifications due to the fact that it is not a sale pursuant to a plan. The application of those principles dictates in my view that the requested release by the first lien lenders should not be ordered.

50 The beneficiaries of the release by the first lien lenders are providing nothing to the first lien lenders in return for the release. The substance of the support agreement was that Nelson agreed to try to fetch as much as it could through a SISP but that if it could not get enough to satisfy the first lien lenders, it agreed to a credit bid by the first lien lenders. Neither Nelson nor the first lien agent or supplemental first lien agent or any other party gave up anything in return for a release from the first lien lenders. So far as RBC releasing a claim that it may have as a first lien lender against the other first lien lenders, nothing has been provided to RBC by the other first lien lenders in return for such a release. RBC as a first lien lender would be required to give up any claim it might have against the other parties to the release for any matters arising prior to or after the support agreement while receiving nothing in return for its release.

In the circumstances, I decline to approve the release by the first lien lenders requested by the applicants to be included in the approval and vesting order.

**(d) Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement**

**51** The applicants seek to have a Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement declared effective and binding on all persons entitled to receive common shares of Purchaser Holdco in connection with the transaction as though such persons were signatories to the Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement.

**52** The Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement is a contract among the purchaser's parent company, Purchaser Holdco, and the holders of Purchaser Holdco's common shares. After implementation of the transaction, the first lien lenders will be the holders of 100% of the shares of Purchaser Holdco. The Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement was negotiated and agreed to by Purchaser Holdco and the First Lien Steering Committee (all first lien lenders except RBC). The First Lien Steering Committee would like RBC to be bound by the agreement. The evidence of this is in the affidavit of Mr. Nordal, the President and CEO of Nelson, who says that based on discussions with Mr. Chadwick, the First Lien Steering Committee requires that all of the first lien lenders to be bound to the terms of the Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement. This is of course double hearsay as Mr. Chadwick acts for Nelson and not the First Lien Steering Committee.

The effect of what is being requested is that RBC as a shareholder of Purchaser Holdco would be bound to some shareholder agreement amongst the shareholders of Purchaser Holdco. While the remaining 88% of the shareholders of Purchaser Holdco might want to bind RBC, I see nothing in the record that would justify such a confiscation of such shareholder rights. I agree with RBC that extending the Court's jurisdiction in these CCAA proceedings and exercising it to assist the purchaser's parent company with its corporate governance is not appropriate. The purchaser and its parent company either have the contractual right to bind all first lien lenders to terms as future shareholders, or they do not.

#### **RBC Motion**

##### **(a) Second lenders' pre-filing interest and second lien agent's fees**

**53** RBC seeks an order that directing Nelson to pay to RBC in its capacity as the second lien agent the second lien interest outstanding at the filing date of CDN\$1,316,181.73 and the second lien fees incurred prior to the filing date of US\$15,365,998.83.

**54** Mr. Zarnett in argument conceded that these amounts are owed under the second lien credit agreement. There are further issues, however, being (i) whether they continue to be owed due to the intercreditor agreement (ii) whether RBC is entitled under the intercreditor agreement to request the payment and (iii) whether RBC is entitled to be paid these under the intercreditor agreement before the first lien lenders are paid in full.

**55** There is a distinction between a lien subordination agreement and a payment subordination agreement. Lien subordination is limited to dealings with the collateral over which both groups of lenders hold security. It gives the senior lender a head start with respect to any enforcement actions in respect of the collateral and ensures a priority waterfall from the proceeds of enforcement over

collateral. It entitles second lien lenders to receive and retain payments of interest, principal and other amounts in respect of a second lien obligation unless the receipt results from an enforcement step in respect of the collateral. By contrast, payment subordination means that subordinate lenders have also subordinated in favour of the senior lender their right to payment and have agreed to turn over all money received, whether or not derived from the proceeds of the common collateral<sup>5</sup>. The intercreditor agreement is a lien subordination agreement, as stated in section 8.2.

56 Nelson and the first lien agent say that RBC has no right to ask the Court to order any payments to it from the cash on hand prior to the closing of the transaction. They rely on the language of section 3.1(a)(1) that provides that until the discharge of the first lien obligations, the second lien collateral agent will not exercise any rights or remedies with respect to any collateral, institute any action or proceeding with respect to such remedies including any enforcement step under the second lien documents. RBC says it is not asking to enforce its security rights but merely asking that it be paid what it is owed and is permitted to receive under the intercreditor agreement, which does not subordinate payments but only liens. It points to section 3.1(c) that provides that:

- (c) Notwithstanding the foregoing (i.e. section 3.1(a) (1)) the Second Lien Collateral Agent and any Second Lien Claimholder may (1)... and may take such other action as it deems in good faith to be necessary to protect its rights in an insolvency proceeding" and (4) may file any... motions... which assert rights... available to unsecured creditors...arising under any insolvency... proceeding.

57 My view of the intercreditor agreement language and what has occurred is that RBC has not taken enforcement steps with respect to collateral. It has asked that payments owing to it under the second lien credit agreement up to the date of filing be paid.

58 Payment of what the second lien lenders are entitled to under the second lien credit agreement is protected under the intercreditor agreement unless it is as the result of action taken by the second lien lenders to enforce their security. Section 3.1(f) of the intercreditor agreement provides as follows:

- (f) Except as set forth in section 3.1(a) and section 4 to the extent applicable, nothing in this Agreement shall prohibit the receipt by the Second Lien Collateral Agent or any Second Lien Claimholders of the required payments of interest, principal and other amounts owed in respect of the Second Lien Obligations or receipt of payments permitted under the First Lien Loan Documents, including without limitation, under section 7.09(a) of the First Lien Credit Agreement, so long as such receipt is not the direct or indirect result of the exercise by the Second Lien Collateral Agent or any Second Lien Claimholders of rights or remedies as a secured creditor (including set off) or enforcement in contravention of this Agreement. ... (underlining added).

59 Section 3.1(a) prohibits the second lien lenders from exercising any rights or remedies with

respect to the collateral before the first liens have been discharged. Section 4 requires any collateral or proceeds thereof received by the first lien collateral agent from a sale of collateral to be first applied to the first lien obligations and requires any payments received by the second lien lenders from collateral in connection with the exercise of any right or remedy in contravention of the agreement must be paid over to the first lien collateral agent.

60 It do not agree with the first lien collateral agent that payment to RBC before the sale closes of amounts owing pre-filing under the second lien credit agreement would be in contravention of section 4.1. That section deals with cash from collateral being received by the first lien collateral agent in connection with a sale of collateral, and provides that it shall be applied to the first lien obligations until those obligations have been discharged. In this case, the cash on hand before any closing will not be received by the first lien collateral agent at all. It will be received after the closing by the purchaser.

61 The first lien collateral agent has made a credit bid on behalf of the first lien lenders. Pursuant to section 3.1(b), that credit bid is deemed to be an exercise of remedies with respect to the collateral held by the first lien lenders. Under the last paragraph of section 3.1(c), until the discharge of the first lien obligations has occurred, the sole right of the second lien collateral agent and the second lien claimholders with respect to the collateral is to hold a lien on the collateral pursuant to the second lien collateral documents and to receive a share of the proceeds thereof, if any, after the discharge of the first lien obligations has occurred. That provision is as follows:

Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, unless and until the discharge of the First Lien Obligations has occurred, except as expressly provided in Sections 3.1(a), 6.3(b) and this Section 3.1(c), the sole right of the Second Lien Collateral Agent and the Second Lien Claimholders with respect to the Collateral is to hold a Lien of the Collateral pursuant to the Second Lien Collateral Documents for the period and to the extent granted therein and to receive a share of the proceeds thereof, if any, after the Discharge of First Lien Obligations has occurred.

62 RBC points out that its rights under section 3.1(f) to receive payment of amounts owing to the second lien lenders is not subject to section 3.1(c) at all. It is not suggested by the first lien collateral agent that this is a drafting error, but it strikes me that it may be. The provision at the end of section 3.1(c) is inconsistent with section 3.1(f) as section 3.1(c) is not an exception to section 3.1(f).

63 Both the liens of the first lien lenders and the second lien lenders are over all of the assets of Nelson. Cash is one of those assets. Therefore if payment were now made to RBC from that cash, the cash would be paid to RBC from the collateral for amounts owing under the second lien credit agreement before the obligations to the first lien lenders were discharged. The obligations to the first lien lenders will be discharged when the sale to the purchaser takes place and the first lien obligations are cancelled.

64 There is yet another provision of the intercreditor agreement that must be considered. It

appears to say that if a judgment is obtained in favour of a second lien lender after exercising rights as an unsecured creditor, the judgment is to be considered a judgment lien subject to the intercreditor agreement for all purposes. Section 3.1(e) provides:

- (e) Except as otherwise specifically set forth in Sections 3.1(a) and (d), the Second Lien Collateral Agent and the Second Lien Claimholders may exercise rights and remedies as unsecured creditors against the Company or any other Grantor that has guaranteed or granted Liens to secure the Second Lien Obligations in accordance with the terms of the Second Lien Loan Documents and applicable law; provided that in the event that any Second Lien Claimholder becomes a judgment creditor in respect of Collateral as a result of its enforcement of its rights as an unsecured creditor with respect to the Second Lien Obligations, **such judgment Lien shall be subject to the terms of this Agreement for all purposes (including in relation to the First Lien Obligations) as the other Liens securing the Second Lien Obligations are subject to this Agreement. (Emphasis added).**

65 What exactly is meant by a "judgment Lien" is not stated in the intercreditor agreement and is not a defined term. If an order is made in this CCAA proceeding that the pre-filing obligations to the second lien collateral agent are to be paid from the cash on hand that Nelson holds, is that a "judgment Lien" meaning that it cannot be exercised before the first lien obligations are discharged? In this case, as the first lien obligations will be discharged as part of the closing of the transaction, does that mean that once the order is made approving the sale and the transaction closes, the cash on hand will go to the purchaser and the judgment Lien will not be paid? It is not entirely clear. But the section gives some indication that a judgment held as a result of the second lien agent exercising rights as an unsecured creditor cannot be used to attach collateral contrary to the agreement if the first lien obligations have not been discharged.

66 I have been referred to a number of cases in which statements have been made as to the need for the priority of secured creditors to be recognized in CCAA proceedings, particularly when distributions have been ordered. While in this case we are not dealing with a distribution generally to creditors, the principles are well known and undisputed. However, in considering the priorities between the first and second lien holders in this case, the intercreditor agreement is what must govern, even with all of its warts.

67 In this case, the cash on hand held by Nelson is collateral, and subject to the rights of the first lien lenders in that collateral. An order made in favour of RBC as second lien agent would reduce that collateral. The overall tenor of the intercreditor agreement, including section 3.1(e), leads me to the conclusion that such an order in favour of RBC should not be made. I do say, however, that the issue is not at all free from doubt and that no credit should be given to those who drafted and settled the intercreditor agreement as it is far from a model of clarity. I decline to make the order sought by RBC.

68 I should note that RBC has made a claim that that Nelson and the first lien lenders who signed the First Lien Support Agreement acted in bad faith and disregarded the interests of the second lien lenders under the intercreditor agreement. RBC claims that the first lien lenders induced Nelson to breach the second lien credit agreement and that this breach resulted in damages to the second lien agent in the amounts of US\$15,365,998.83 on account of interest and CDN\$1,316,181.73 on account of fees. RBC says that these wrongs should be taken into account in considering whether the credit bid should be accepted and that the powers under section 11 of the CCAA should be exercised to order these amounts to be paid to RBC as second lien agent.

69 I decline to do so. No decision on this record could be possibly be made as to whether these wrongs took place. The claim for inducing breach of contract surfaced in the RBC factum filed just two days before the hearing and it would be unfair to Nelson or the first lien lenders to have to respond without the chance to fully contest these issues. Moreover, even the release sought by the applicants would not prevent RBC or any second lien lender from bringing an action for wrongs committed. RBC is able to pursue relief for these alleged wrongs in a separate action.

**(b) Consent fee**

70 The first lien lenders who signed the First Lien Support Agreement were paid a consent fee. That agreement, and particularly the term sheet made a part of it, provided that those first lien lenders who signed the agreement would be paid a consent fee.

71 RBC contends that because the consent fee was calculated for each first lien lender that signed the First Lien Support Agreement on the amount of the loans that any consenting first lien lenders held under the first lien credit agreement, the consent fee was paid on account of the loans and thus because all first lien lenders were to be paid equally on their loans on a pro rata basis, RBC is entitled to be paid its share of the consent fees.

72 Section 2.14 of the first lien credit agreement provides in part, as follows:

If, other than as expressly provided elsewhere herein, **any Lender shall obtain on account of the Loans made by it, or the participations in L/C Obligations and Swing Line Loans held by it, any payment (whether voluntary, involuntary, through the exercise of any right of setoff, or otherwise) in excess of its ratable share (or other share contemplated hereunder) thereof, such Lender shall immediately (a) notify the Administrative Agent of such fact, and (b) purchase from the other Lenders such participations in the Loans made by them and/or such subparticipations in the participations in L/C Obligations or Swing Line Loans held by them, as the case may be, as shall be necessary to cause such purchasing Lender to share the excess payment in respect of such Loans or such participations, as the case may be, pro rata with each of them . . . [emphasis added].**

73 RBC says that while the section refers to a first lien lender obtaining a payment "on account" of its loan, U.S. authorities under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code have held that the words "on account of" do not mean "in exchange for" but rather mean "because of." As the consent payments are calculated on the amount of the loan of any first lien lender who signed the term sheet, RBC says that they were made because of their loan and thus RBC is entitled to its share of the consent fees that were paid by virtue of section 2.14 of the first lien credit agreement.

74 I do not accept that argument. The consent fees were paid because the consenting first lien lenders signed the First Lien Support Agreement. The fact that their calculation depended on the amount of the loan made by each consenting first lien lender does not mean they were made because of the loan. RBC declined to sign the First Lien Support Agreement and is not entitled to a consent fee.

### Conclusion

75 An order is to go in accordance with these reasons. As there has been mixed success, there shall be no order as to costs.

F.J.C. NEWBOULD J.

1 I do not think that Mr. Gropper's views on what particular sections of the agreement meant is the proper subject of expert opinion on foreign law. Such an expert should confine his evidence to a statement of what the law is and how it applies generally and not express his opinion on the very facts in issue before the court. See my comments in *Nortel Networks Corp. (Re)* (2014), 20 C.B.R. (6th) 171 para. 103.

2 See *Re Nortel Networks Corp.* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 at paras. 35-40 and *Re Brainhunter Inc.* [2009] O.J. No. 5207 at paras. 12-13.

3 *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).

4 This case does not involve a plan under the CCAA. One of the reasons for this may be that pursuant to section 6.9(b) of the intercreditor agreement, in the event the applicants commence any restructuring proceeding in Canada and put forward a plan, the applicants, the first lien lenders and the second lien lenders agreed that the first lien lenders and the second lien lenders should be classified together in one class. The second lien lenders agreed that they would only vote in favour of a plan if it satisfied one of two conditions, there was no contractual restriction on their ability to vote against a plan.

5 See 65 A.B.A. Bus Law. 809-883 (May 2010).

